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In an illuminating 2002 article in the Modern Law Review, Hillary
Charlesworth spoke of how “international lawyers revel in a good crisis.”2 As
she elaborated, “A crisis provides a focus for the development of the discipline
and it also allows international lawyers the sense that their work is of immediate,
intense relevance.”3 A cursory examination of how the origins, rationale and
evolution of different branches of public international law are described in
dominant histories of the field will take us on a narrative path that lurches from
crisis to crisis. The holocaust offers an especially illuminating example of how
a particular historical conjuncture is invoked to describe a crisis in the
international system, and where international law is presented as developing a
salutary response, in this case the human rights framework, that underscore’s
international law’s relevance and adequacy to the crisis. In Charlesworth’s
article, she uses the Kosovo crisis as the ‘crisis-space’4 through which to
understand how international law mobilizes crisis to assert and delimit the
questions pertinent to a historical moment, and, concomitantly, offer answers
that advance and empower the discipline and profession of international law.
Charlesworth makes a compelling argument that the crisis approach to the
discipline truncates international law’s imagination of how it operates in the
world, narrows the socio-historical issues it takes into account and neglects
structural dimensions of a historical moment. We jump from incident to incident
in international relations without analyzing the threads that tie them together,
and shape both the enabling conditions and enduring consequences of ‘crisis’.
For instance, she describes how the gender dynamics of international relations
get neglected as we focus on the headlines rather than probing the biases,

1 The words “mad and melancholy record” are taken from Robert Jackson’s description of the history
that the Nuremberg trials told but it could equally be, I argue, the story told about international law
itself. One Hundred and Eighty-Seventh Day, NUREMBURG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, July 26,1946,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-26-46.asp.
2 Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline of Crisis, 65 THE MOD. L. REV. 377, 377 (2002).
3 Id.
4 The term ‘crisis-space’ is indebted to David Scott’s conceptualization of the term “problem space” as
a way to speak of the production of a problem in ways that prefigure the answers. See Stuart Hall,
David Scott, BOMB (1 June 2005), https://bombmagazine.org/articles/david-scott/. Crisis space speaks
to the specificity of the issues being discussed in this article.
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hierarchies, and exclusions that are baked into those headline international
incidents. 5
In this article, I build on Charlesworth’s insight in examining histories of
international legal development that link international law to international
relations, and in particular to crisis in the international system. What is striking
about the work of crisis invocation in international law is that it is itself a
response to how international law labors under a sense of its own legitimacy
crisis—is it real law? Is it adequate to the problems and challenges that disrupt
and threaten world order? These questions have long haunted the discipline, and
again and again it has responded with theorizations and histories of its own role
in international affairs that have doubled down on the crisis of international law
by externalized it, and harnessing crisis talk in the production of legitimacy for
international law as an important response to crisis, rather than as being in crisis
or producing crisis.6 Today, we see these narratives of international law
proliferate in response to revived and reinvigorated strands of authoritarianism
across the world. For instance, in the transition from the Trump administration
to the Biden administration, a range of commentators heralded the latter for
promising a return to a liberal world order that pulls back from the crisis of
authoritarianism by embracing international law and international institutions. I
argue instead that rather than redeem international law, we need to see the crisisspace of the current moment as an opportunity to interrogate the dark side of
international law, including its intimate imbrication with histories of racial
capitalism over the last four hundred years.
How did the crisis of racial capitalism boomerang into the crisis-space of
authoritarianism that the world is confronting today?7 In thinking through this
question, I turn to past histories of international law and crisis. This article draws
from my earlier work critically analyzing two historical projects, one from the
mid-nineteenth century and one from the mid-twentieth century; both tell a story
about the politics of accountability and its institutional channeling into
international law and judicial institutions.8 The first case I look at is Gary Bass’s
account of Nuremberg in his history of post-war judicial processes as an

5 For an analysis of how invocations of crisis empower particular strands of international conflict
feminism See Karen Engle, Vasuki Nesiah and Diane Otto, “Feminist Approaches to International
Law” in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack, eds., International Legal Theory: Foundations and
Frontiers, (Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press).
6 See Dunoff and Pollack Ibid. for discussion of the constitutive role of ‘crisis’ in a range of subfields
across international law.
7 In using the term “boomerang” I echo Aime Cesaire and Hannah Arendt’s invocation of the term to
speak to the relationship between violence against the colonized in the global south, and the violence
of fascism in Europe. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1973); AIMÉ CÉSAIRE,
DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (Monthly Rev. Press 1972) (1955).
8 The two articles I draw from are (1) Vasuki Nesiah, Doing History with Impunity, ANTI-IMPUNITY
AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller, & D.M. Davis eds., 2016), an earlier
article that looks not only at Nuremberg but also engages with Bass’s discussion of Constantinople
and The Hague, and (2) Vasuki Nesiah, Crimes Against Humanity: Racialized Subjects and
Deracialized Histories, THE NEW HISTORIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: RETRIALS (Immi
Tallgren & Thomas Skouteris, eds., 2019); a significantly shorter and revised version was published
as Vasuki Nesiah, The Law of Humanity has a Canon: Translating Racialized World Order into
“Colorblind” Law, POLAR: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REVIEW (Nov. 15, 2020),
https://polarjournal.org/2020/11/15/the-law-of-humanity-has-a-canon-translating-racialized-worldorder-into-colorblind-law/.
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alternative to vengeance in the fight against impunity. For Bass this is
inspiration for a future of international criminal law that can entrench the rule of
law and a normatively grounded world order. The second case I look at is Jenny
Martinez’s account of the mid-century tribunals that were instituted on diverse
shores of the Atlantic Ocean to monitor the abolishing of the slave trade from
1807 on.10 For Martinez this is inspiration for a future of international criminal
law that can deal with race and racial injustice. Both these histories of
international law, present courts and tribunals as marrying morality to power in
response to the crisis of “radical evil”— a Kantian term that is perhaps most
famous amongst international human rights lawyers from the title of Carlos
Nino’s book Radical Evil on Trial.11 From Nuremberg’s trial of Nazi officials
to the trial of the Argentinian military dictators, Nino argued for the preventive
charge of international law through prosecutions in the crisis-space of human
rights atrocity in facilitating transition to democracy . Nino’s articulates the
governing rationale of international criminal law that international lawyers have
found most compelling, often in the name of victims and as part of a vision of
an international law anchored post-war world order.
My analysis in this article draws on two separate papers I have previously
published; each of which has a more extended engagement with the arguments
of Bass and Martinez respectively. This article brings those distinct projects into
conversation by examining the work of crisis space dynamics in redemptive
teleologies about international law’s centrality to the international system in
these different historical conjunctures, the aftermath of the holocaust in Bass and
the aftermath of the international slave trade in Martinez. This article argues that
when we attend to international law’s imbrication in the histories and legacies
of slavery, colonialism, and other dimensions of racial capitalism, we may well
discover that international law also worked to legitimize and empower the world
order that enabled these crises. Thus, the Bass and Martinez histories of
international law tell a story that purports to show international law as offering
a progressive response to various moments of world crisis; however, closer
examination may reveal that these histories frame and reframe the crisis-space
of these moments in ways that deny and distract from the legacies of racial
capitalism. Rather than focus only on international law and its response to fascist
violence, we need to also look at how that response ignores, distracts from, or
even facilitates colonial and neocolonial oppression. Rather than focus only on
international law and its story of the abolition of the slave trade in the 19th
century or its condemnation of genocide in the 20th century, we need to also look
at international law’s history facilitating slavery and racial oppression.
The Bass and Martinez interventions offer two examples of how crisis talk
gets knit into a redemptive turn to history by noted scholars of international law
and international relations. Both these liberal internationalist histories were
written at different moments in the fortunes of international criminal law, but
both advance a historical narrative that points towards a redemptive anti-

9 GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
(2000).
10 JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
(2012).
11 CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1998).

2021

THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW HISTORIES

235

impunity telos. Bass’s Stay the Hand of Vengeance was published in 2000 at a
moment of great optimism about ICL. The Rome Statute had been passed two
years earlier, capping a decade long Grotian moment for international criminal
law—moving from ad hoc tribunals in The Hague and Arusha to several rounds
of drafting of a new statute for the international criminal court. If the end of the
cold war and the spiral into an extended war in the Balkans threw international
law into crisis, by the end of the 1990s, international law saw itself as having
developed an effective response, not just to the Balkans but to wars and war
crimes everywhere. Bass’s history told a story that situated the ICC within a
century long honing of ICL’s normative, statutory and institutional muscle to
fight impunity, rather than being just an ad hoc solution to the immediate crisis.12
Over a decade later, in 2012, when Jenny Martinez published The Slave
Trade and the Origins of International Humanitarian Law, the ICC had lost its
luster and was being threatened with mass withdrawals from African Union
(AU) countries as it confronted damning criticisms of a racist focus on Africa
and Africans, while the west enjoyed impunity in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere. Responding to this legitimacy crisis, Martinez speaks to the
progressive potential of ICL as illuminated with an even longer historical
perspective that looks at the work of transnational tribunals in responding to the
crisis of the international slave trade by helping implement its abolition in
tribunals that were established a century before Nuremberg. In the following
pages, I begin by thinking with and against Bass’s discussion of Nuremberg
before moving back to Martinez’s 19th century history of the Freetown tribunals.
The last section develops some concluding reflections about how we may move
forward in thinking through the relationship between international law and crisis
on the world stage in confronting authoritarianism today.
I. NUREMBERG: “THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TRIBUTE THAT POWER HAS
PAID TO REASON”13
In his ambitious history of post-war justice on the international stage, Gary
Bass seeks to establish the long history of war crimes tribunals and efforts
towards such tribunals from Britain’s assessment of prosecutorial options postWorld War I (including preliminary efforts in that direction at Leipzig and
Constantinople), through to the US led efforts at Nuremberg, and then on to the
ad hoc tribunals of the ‘90s, leading up to the ICC. He presents these efforts as
a rejection of impunity for accountability; a rejection of vengeful war for

12 This was so despite the fact that the ICTY and its twin, the ICTR, are often referred to as ad hoc
tribunals because their mandates are specific to each context; However, these UN creations are also
situated by Bass and others in a historical pattern ( the ‘justice cascade’) of an increased turn to
international criminal law that culminates in the ICC. In addition to Bass Ibid., see Kathryn Sikkink,
THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS
(2012).
13 See BASS, supra note 9, at 47. Bass quotes Robert Jackson’s opening statement at the trials to frame
his own claims about Nuremberg’s significance in the history of war crimes adjudication. Jackson’s
opening statement for the Prosecution at Nuremberg gave Bass’s book its subtitle and the broader
theme that ties the fight against impunity for the wrongs of war to the legalist triumph over the quest
for vengeance: “That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most
significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.” See infra at 32.
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tribunalized justice. In his telling, these are way stations in the struggle for
humanist idealism in liberal states’ international relations, and in this way they
also become founding stones in international law’s development as it hones its
response to global crises.15 His is a nuanced and complex account; it is not a
story of the forces of justice moving forward with clarity of purpose and
definitive institutional force; rather, it is a story of justice “lurching forward”
unevenly and incrementally, emboldened at some points and compromised at
others, but with forward momentum nevertheless. There are two struggles in
Bass’s account: an internal struggle within liberal states for the better angels to
triumph over the Kissingeresque realists, and an external struggle with so called
illiberal states.16 With a direction and force forged through those battles against
vengeance on the one hand, and impunity on the other, Bass claims there has
been a long movement towards legalism and international justice as the more
effective and noble response to the crisis of war crimes and mass atrocity. That
response becomes embodied through international criminal law in “a wellinstitutionalized international forum where such cases can be heard”; ultimately,
this emerges as a story of fitful progress towards the rule of law and its
redemption.
Nuremberg looms large in the Bass narrative, and it is that part of the Bass
story that I will focus on in this article because of its resonance with the dominant
international law history of that episode as well.17 The trials are presented as
performatively enacting the Allies’ moral authority in the defeat of fascism,
embodied most crucially in this institutional commitment to international law as
the foundation of the new post war world order. In Bass’s narrative, Nuremberg
emerges as the historical, moral and institutional centerpiece; it is the linchpin
that helps connect the cosmopolitan humanist dots from Leipzig to The Hague.
This arc of the story translates as a progressive narrative of international law
increasingly focused on the fight against impunity as it navigates the storms of
the 20th century with the highest ideals of global citizenship as its loadstar.
At the beginning of the century discussions about war crimes and the
genocide against the Armenians leading into Versailles post-World War I
represented a burgeoning universalism in responding to crisis, and the
accompanying notion that humanity had a common stake in the conduct of war
and peace. For Bass, this is the moment that births a notion of humanity that is
grounded in collective moral condemnation of the inhuman, namely crimes that
were so egregious as to be classified ‘crimes against humanity’. Yet these antiimpunity intentions did not materialize in robust prosecutions of World War I
war crimes. It is this gap between intent and legal action that was corrected with
Nuremberg. Bass describes Nuremberg as a triumph against all odds. Indeed,
when FDR and Churchill met in Quebec to discuss policy for the war’s end, they
both signed a statement agreeing to summarily execute Nazi leadership.18 For
Bass, the policy shift from executions to trials is a shift from vengeance to liberal
14 See BASS, supra note 9, at 329-30.
15 Id. at 37–38. Indeed, he says that a kernel of the international legal liberalism that matured into an ICL
policy that culminated in the ICC was laid in the early 1800s in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars.
16 Id. at 186. As exemplified for instance by Nuremberg in contrast to Stalin’s prescription for mass
executions.
17 See generally id. Significantly, Tokyo is referenced by Bass but largely ignored, as his primary
preoccupation is the Nuremberg trials. This is the fate of Tokyo in most human rights histories!
18 Id. at 151.
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legalism that pulls the aftermath of WWII into the international human rights
law history books. Bass describes the change in policy as one that emerged
through a series of “David against Goliath” battles fought in the realms of public
opinion,19 policy making,20 and international diplomacy21 to become what
Nuremberg prosecutor Robert Jackson would famously pronounce as “the most
significant tribute that power has ever paid to reason.”22
Bass seeks to do several things in his depiction of the Nuremberg court as
the unlikely hero of the postwar settlement that followed the severity of the
WWII crisis-space. Most significantly, he wants to cast criminal prosecutions as
an astonishing achievement of universalist ideals which emerge through an epic
struggle against numerous obstacles and wide-ranging opposition. Antiimpunity represents, in this narrative, a harnessing of the best of the American
system’s cosmopolitan promise to the international legal response to war.
Quoting Henry Stimson, American Secretary of War, in his effort to reform
Germans “with the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court,” Bass describes
Nuremberg as a “trial proposal” that emerges from “the Constitution, the holy
of holies in American domestic politics.”23 It is a humanist vision about the
possibilities of a cosmopolitan peace that perseveres against the forces of evil
and lays an international law foundation for a new world order.
In addition to a celebration of Nuremberg as a flag for judicial due process
rather than vengeance, Bass’s broader narrative is also interested in making the
case that Nuremberg clarifies that the principled commitment to the political
virtues of law and due process is Ariadne’s thread helping liberal states confront
crisis by giving them a sense of direction and purpose; it also helps, Bass argues,
retrospectively make sense of a century marked by war and wartime impunity
and the maze of conflicting policy paths that different international actors
advocated at different moments. As he tells the story, from Constantinople to
Nuremberg, the mantle of liberal idealism shifts from Britain to the United States
as the voice of progress in a universalist struggle against impunity. If the impulse
19 Id. at 169. When the American public was surveyed, summary executions against the German and
Japanese leadership trumped all other options in public opinion polls. The legalistic response became
celebrated and framed in patriotic rhetoric regarding the American commitment to law only after the
trials had begun. Indeed, for many, it was only after they were completed.
20 Id. Bass pays much attention to the internal battle within the American cabinet, with Secretary of War
Henry Stimson, who advocated trials, waging a long battle against Secretary of State Hans
Morgenthau, who favored summary executions and the blitzing of German industrial power. President
Roosevelt shifted to a more temperate position when it became apparent that it was more politically
expedient to ensure Germany survived as a viable trading partner.
21 Id. at 173–80. Bass layers his depiction of the internal policy battles within the higher echelons of
American policymaking with an account of the external battles on the highest echelons of international
relations. The US push for trials battled against the British and Soviet preference for the execution
option. Eventually Robert Jackson, who later served as America’s Chief Prosecutor in Nuremberg,
negotiated terms for the London Charter that reflected the American vision for a war crimes tribunal.
Finally, Bass notes that the scope of the Nuremberg prosecutions was also one that emerged through
fraught negotiations within the US and amongst allies. In the early stages of negotiation, there was
much support for focusing only on acts of German aggression that entailed breaches of international
law against other nations. There was doubt about whether there were political and legal grounds to
also take on atrocities within Germany. Thus, initially the Holocaust itself was going to be side stepped
and treated as an internal matter. Eventually, however, with lobbying from the American Jewish
diaspora and discussions within the American team negotiating the London charter, the U.S. position
called for a broader focus on anti-impunity. This expanded prosecution agenda succeeded in winning
the day in negotiations with the allies as well.
22 Id. at 147.
23 Id. at 164–66.

238

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. XI:2

to prosecute crimes against humanity emerges from British idealists coming to
terms with the ashes of World War I, their vision at that moment get vindicated
by American idealists who argued for Nuremberg from the ashes of World War
II. The passage revealed by Ariadne’s thread through the maze of conflicting
national interests and competing visions of international relations was gradual
and challenging but each step taken in the direction of anti-impunity is an
achievement. Indeed, Bass repeatedly notes that each step forward is not to be
taken for granted. It was not inevitable; Nuremberg was the majestic triumph of
high-minded commitment to legalism despite the lesser resolve of allies and
fellow travelers.
A. RESITUATING MID-20TH CENTURY INSTITUTION BUILDING: A
TRIBUTE TO ACCOUNTABILITY OR IMPUNITY?
The invocation of a crisis-space is by necessity a portrayal that includes
somethings within the frame and excludes others, it highlights some events and
ignores others. In Bass’s framing, the focus is on the crisis of WWII criminality
–
and
this
is
where
he
gets
his
optimistic
portrayal
of international law’s response as manifest in the Nuremberg trials. By attending
to how Bass’ framing delimits how he sees the problem, and concomitantly, how
he assesses the work of international law, we can also attend for what is excluded
from his analysis of crisis and how we might then assess the work of
international law differently. For instance if we look at the war crimes of those
who prosecuted at Nuremberg, not just those who were prosecuted, Nuremberg
emerges not only as a symbol of the struggle against impunity, but as an icon of
impunity. International law facilitates the equation of victors’ justice with justice
as such, the equation of impunity for victors as anti-impunity.24 Consider, for
instance, the week in August 1945 when the London Charter was drafted. The
London Charter, or the Charter of the International Military Tribunal as it is
officially titled (and to which Bass gives the Americans the central role in
establishing), details the mandate and procedure of the Nuremberg trials. It was
signed by the Allies on August 8, 1945, sandwiched between the US bombing
of Hiroshima on August 6 and the US bombing of Nagasaki on August 9. The
‘crisis’ of these bombings for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not
enter Bass’s crisis space or disturb his positing of Nuremberg as a choice of antiimpunity over impunity, of American liberal legalism over vengeance, or even,
in the words of Robert Jackson, of reason over power.
That second week of August 1945, encapsulates how impunity for crimes
against non-White peoples can be braided with a delimited commitment to
accountability. The weight of Nuremberg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the annals
of international law bake these racial logic into the international law canon, and
its legitimation of imperial power.25 In Bass’s narrative, America’s imperial
24 See also Mahmood Mamdani, Beyond Nuremberg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid
Transition in South Africa, ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida
Miller, & D.M. Davis eds., 2016).
25 Jack Goldsmith, The Shadow of Nuremberg, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012). Obama, for instance, has
employed the Nuremberg trials themselves to make the argument about American exceptionalism
arguing that “the Nuremberg trials” were “part of what made us different” in ways that “taught the
entire world about who we are.”
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power is ignored or rendered as a benevolent servant to the democracy and the
rule of law rather than white supremacy or imperial conquest. 26 These
contradictions may not simply be dimensions of American empire, but may well
be more central to international legal liberalism and the world order which it
birthed: from the nation-state27 to human rights28 to “humanitarian reason.”29
Thus contra Bass, we suggest that the “dark side of virtue” in international law
may be central to the foundational concepts of liberalism and their institutional
and legal embodiment on the international stage.30
The delimiting of the accountability mandate of Nuremberg is striking. The
London Charter not only sidestepped its twinned siblings, Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, it also ignored a host of allegations about Allied war crimes that had
taken place over the duration of the war.31 These crimes included civilian air
raids such as the bombing of Dresden by the British and Americans,32 wartime
rapes by occupying Russian soldiers in Berlin, the killing of German prisoners
of war in Dachau, and many more acts of torture, ill treatment, and killings of
both civilians and enemy combatants.33 The London Charter designates the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction as crimes against peace (a precursor to the
modern crime of aggression), war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
However, the Charter also indicates that this is not a “universalist” approach to
these crimes; rather, the Tribunal was established “for the trial and punishment”
of persons committing these crimes only when they are “acting in the interests
of the European Axis countries.”34 Thus, the statement of the Court’s jurisdiction
in advancing a measure of accountability for some is tethered to its advancing
the impunity of others in all these other instances of crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Significantly, Bass’s narration of the Nuremberg story focuses primarily on
the development of an American post-war policy on trials and the negotiations

26 After the Attack…The War on Terrorism, MONTHLY REVIEW (Nov. 1, 2001). For example, in the wake
of post 9/11 U.S. strikes on Afghanistan in October 2001, the editors of Monthly Review began their
November issue noting that “in Britain, empire was justified as a benevolent ‘white man’s burden.’
And in the United States, empire does not even exist; ‘we’ are merely protecting the causes of freedom,
democracy and justice worldwide.” See also Michael Ignatieff who defends American empire in YORK
EMPIRE LITE: NATION BUILDING IN BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN (2003).
27 See generally ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005).
28 See generally COSTAS DOUZINAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
COSMOSPOLITANISM (2007). See also Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS L., 1 (2002).
29 DIDIER FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE PRESENT (RACHEL GOMME
TRANS., 2011).
30 See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2004). In fact the relationship between impunity and anti-impunity, may well be
the geo-political projection of the psychological construction of selfhood, where splitting the domain
of impunity and the domain of anti-impunity is also a negotiation between those two domains and the
actors relevant to each. See also NATHANIEL BERMAN, PASSION AND AMBIVALENCE: COLONIALISM,
NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2012).
31 SEE EVA FAUEN, TOP 10 ALLIED WAR CRIMES OF WORLD WAR II, LISTVERSE (DEC. 14, 2012),
HTTP://LISTVERSE.COM/2012/12/14/TOP-10-ALLIED-WAR-CRIMES-OF-WORLD-WAR-II.
32 See KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE (1991); RICHARD OVERY, The Post-War Debate,
FIRESTORM: THE BOMBING OF DRESDEN,1945, 123–42 (Paul Addison & Jeremy, eds., 2006).
33 See HAROLD MARCUSE, LEGACIES OF DACHAU: THE USES AND ABUSES OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP,
1933–2001, (2001) (book by Herbert Marcuse’s grandson).
34 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, ch. II, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
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amongst the Allies that led to the London Charter. There is very little on the
actual trials themselves, and he pays no attention to the specifics of the cases or
what Jackson, in his summation, described as the “Trial’s mad and melancholy
record.”35 The establishment of the court emerges as sufficient achievement for
those championing accountability through international law. However, there is
value in taking Nuremberg outside the debate about the pros and cons of such
efforts to understand its significance, because here too we can see the
accountability conversation as a footnote to a larger project. In particular, there
is value in looking at the work done by Nuremberg in the post-war global
landscape: a performative enactment of exceptionalism for a world audience
(one which continues to be performed to this day)36 to amplify the moral
authority claimed by the Allies in shaping the post-war world order. After all
this was not only a post war moment but a post colonialism moment; anti
colonial movements had swept across the global south and most countries were
in different stages of achieving independence. Already, the framing of the war
effort itself as a fight for democracy and liberty distracted from the
embarrassment of colonialism, not only on the global stage but also in various
national theaters.37 However, going forward, what would prove even more
significant would be Nuremberg’s place in the architecture of post-colonial
global governance.
The narrative of Nuremberg as an ode to liberal global governance is an
anthem to the world order birthed in the ashes of the war and its claim to
universalist legitimacy even as formerly colonized countries were emerging as
nation-states. Perhaps this is why even the details of the trials are ignored by
Bass; the institution of the court itself is the signature of global governance
announcing a new era – not just ending the war but announcing a new era of
American hegemony in this post-colonial period. It contributes to the
endorsement of the position of the US led allies as arbiters of a new world order
in which their military victory is entrenched not only through the antidemocratic design of the Security Council, but also through the international
financial institutions (“IFIs”) established in that same period. The United
Nations and the Security Council were established in October 1945. Only a few
weeks later, in November 1945, the Nuremberg trials got underway according
to the terms drafted in the London Charter. The next month, the International
Monetary Fund was established and (together with the World Bank) went on to
push a plethora of policies that continued the “planned misery” that
characterized colonialism.38 The momentous international institution-building
that took place in the last three months of 1945 produced organizations that were
deeply intertwined, not just in their origins, but also in their trajectories.
Scholars such a Elizabeth Bogwardt, Jessica Whyte and Quinn Slobodian
have traced different dimensions of these intertwined paths. Bogwardt has

35 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 19, Day 187, July 26, 1946, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School.
36 See Jack Goldsmith, The Shadow of Nuremberg, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/books/review/justice-and-the-enemy-nuremberg-9-11-and-thetrial-of-khalid-sheikh-mohammed-by-william-shawcross-book-review.html.
37 See, e.g., AURIOL WEINGOLD, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT AND INDIA: PROPAGANDA DURING WW II
(2008). Auriol Weingold’s story on Churchill’s use of the war in catalyzing US animus towards the
“Quit India” movement.
38 I take the term ‘planned misery’ from Susan Marks, Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57
(2011).
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argued that Nuremberg, Bretton Woods, and the United Nations were projects
in the three-part institutional architecture designed to empower America in postwar global governance.39 Bogwardt describes this brave new world as an
achievement bringing to life the blueprint of the 1941 Atlantic Charter that
expressed the United Kingdom’s and United States’ joint interests. In the
Atlantic Charter, the Anglo-American alliance declared that “after the final
destruction of Nazi tyranny,” it aimed “to see established a peace which
will . . . afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in
freedom from fear and want,” thereby employing various euphemisms which
linked the agenda of fighting the Nazis with the military and economic agendas
of the Allies.40 In tracing the intellectual history of that economic agenda, both
Whyte and Slobodian describe the institutionalization of a “neo-liberal model of
world governance”41 , in countering decolonization and the prospect of
democratization of the international order. Nuremberg can be situated not only
in the history of war crimes prosecutions, but also in the history of transnational
judicial bodies that became central to this model. While Slobodian does not
make the connection to Nuremberg, he speaks of the institutional vision of that
model as entailing the “creation of supranational judicial bodies like the
European Court of Justice and the WTO to override national legislation that
might disrupt the global rights of capital.42 It is not only that Nuremberg was a
supranational judicial body, but that it also spoke to the notion of a global
adjudication of political morality that trumped that of the nation-state precisely
at the moment when the majority of the world’s people were forming themselves
into nation-states. Moreover, as in Bass’s narrative, Nuremberg is often taken as
the symbol of human rights and that supranational archimedan perspective. As
both Slobodian and Whyte emphasize, human rights (‘the morals of the market”
as Whyte puts it) was especially important to this story; it is what tethers the
post-war human rights regime that Nuremberg represents with the agendas of
the neoliberal model of world governance that worked to defeat decolonization
of the new world order in the postcolonial moment.
The most significant implication of the story of the interlinked post-war
institutional projects resituates Nuremberg in the wider landscape of global
governance in relation both to “peace and security,” as well as to trade and
political economy. As we have discussed Bass’s account of Nuremberg is the
centerpiece in a history of 20th century international relations through a narrative
about accountability for war crimes. The historical arc of this story ignores, and
implicitly endorses, the post-war settlement and the inauguration of what some
might call the era of neo-colonialism.43 In resituating Nuremberg in this way I
have tried to reexamine the work of international law and international
institutions in this historical conjuncture.

39 ELIZABETH BOGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(2007).
40 The Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.
41 P. 6 of Slobodian Ibid.
42 P. 12-13 of Slobodian.
43George
Monbiot,
Clearing
Up
This
Mess,
THE
GUARDIAN,
https://www.monbiot.com/2008/11/18/clearing-up-this-mess/ (Nov. 18, 2008) (detailing more radical
proposals, such as Keynes’ proposal for an International Clearing Union to help debtor countries, that
were defeated by the Americans in favor of the IMF).
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For many states, the real stakes may not have been criminal justice but
various alternative projects, including particular territorial, economic, and
governance agendas that moved forward without opposition partly because postwar criminal justice measures got equated with justice as such. As I have
discussed in greater detail elsewhere, there is a parallel between Nuremberg and
the other waystations (Constantinople, The Hague) in Bass’s narrative of
international crisis and international law.44 For instance, just as Nuremberg
becomes the story about accountability in ways that advance a redemptive
history endorsing the post-war II world order, ICL institutions of the Hague era
served a parallel function in the post-Cold War world order. Just as the
prosecution of German officials for war crimes at Nuremberg contributed to the
legitimacy of international legal institutions in ways that distract from the
impunity enjoyed by others for war crimes as monstrous as Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. The work of the International Criminal Court in the name of
accountability, stood alongside the refusal of accountability for atrocities that
resulted from the US led war and occupation of Afghanistan and Ira in the very
same moment of the ICC’s work. Moreover, in all these cases, a story of crisis
that focusses on war crimes and short, intense periods of extraordinary violence
normalizes systematic abuses and ordinary or “slow violence.” The ambitious
century-long scope of Bass’s narrative, and the intertwined role of legal
argument and political maneuvering in his portrayal of international courts as
champions of accountability and human rights in responding to international
crisis, makes him a particularly valuable interlocutor for our discussion. Bass
sees a unidirectional arrow from Constantinople to Nuremberg to The Hague.
Strategic jostling by key political players on the international stage, the gradual
development of a global human rights consciousness, international institutions,
and the professional activists who staffed them all play a role in ensuring this
arrow stayed its course. In Bass’s story, although the human rights and
accountability arrow may shoot straight ahead in some periods, while lurching
forward unsteadily in others, the directionality is one of liberal states becoming
more “liberal” and matching their political behavior to their political ethics. This
framing does enormous work as a redemptive narrative that heralds liberal
pieties of global North states as being “in the interests of humanity.”45
In contrast to Bass’s account, we have foregrounded arrows whizzing in
other directions, including toward impunity. Moreover, at various historical
junctures the significance of international criminal tribunals may not lie in their
anti-impunity work but in dynamics that pertain to other dimensions of
international politics such as the establishment of the IFIs and related institutions
alongside Nuremberg as referenced above. This part of the article sought to
situate the notion of international legal accountability not as a trans-historical
high-minded ideal that travels from Constantinople to The Hague via
Nuremberg, but as one that has had particular and contested backstories with
specific political stakes in each of these moments of “tribunalizing justice.”
Accordingly, we have foregrounded areas such as global political economy,
distribution, and redistribution as central to how we interpret international law’s

44 Nesiah, supra note 8.
45 GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM’S BATTLE: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 24 (2008).

2021

THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW HISTORIES

243

accountability initiatives and situate their relationship to global governance as
a whole.
By foregrounding the structures and interpretive disputes that attend
invocations of accountability, we can look at what work “accountability” is
actually doing that warrants critical scrutiny—such as the narrowing of the
human rights agenda to accountability only for extraordinary as opposed to
ordinary violence, or for individuals rather than structures. Significantly, in
Nuremberg as in the other contexts Bass discusses, accountability projects may
have legitimized the dominant global order in the name of liberal political ethics
and therefore helped entrench impunity in other realms. In my counter-account,
I have highlighted how the domain of accountability initiatives in international
criminal law has been limited to certain demarcated zones—primarily war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression (and their
canonical definitions)—while there has been wide impunity for atrocities such
as exploitative terms of international trade which enable and condition socioeconomic abuses. Similarly, my counternarrative has drawn attention to the
ways in which the mantle of legitimacy that is vested in claims to accountability
has authorized companion agendas by association and delegitimized challenges
to the dominant order as ones that risk empowering war criminals and criminal
regimes. In other words, the dominance of the narrative that there is a turn to
accountability in international law is itself doing work that I have aimed to
unpack and critique. For our purposes, this is particularly telling as a story about
the labor of international law in Nuremberg, the most celebrated incident for
celebrants of international law’s response to crisis.
II. FREETOWN: THE CROSSROADS OF SLAVERY/COLONIALISM/RACIAL
CAPITALISM

For many advocates of international law’s salutary history, the backdrop of
Nuremberg heralding the promise of the ICC when the Rome Statute came into
force in July 2002. However, a decade after the ICC had opened its doors, its
own record provided a less optimistic prognosis about the future of international
criminal law. In 2012, when Martinez’s book came out, the ICC had proven
ineffective in responding to world crises, including and especially the atrocities
by America and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, when it did act, the
ICC faced charges of wielding racist and colonial prosecutorial policies. It is in
the context of this contemporary legitimacy crisis that Martinez steps back a
century before Nuremberg to look for alternative inspiration for the ICC’s
promise in addressing struggles over structural racism in the world order and she
finds that alternative inspiration in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Freetown was one
of a number of locations along the Atlantic coasts where tribunals were
established with the authority to monitor the abolition of the slave trade in the
middle of the 19th century. They were instituted under the aegis of AngloEuropean and Anglo-American political legal and military authority on
territories that had been colonized on both sides of the Atlantic. They were
known as ‘mixed tribunals’ to indicate their transnational legal provenance,
jurisdiction, and staffing. The ‘mixed tribunal’ in Freetown was by far the most
significant of these. Courts were initially established in Brazil (an AngloPortuguese court), Cuba (an Anglo-Spanish court), Surinam (an Anglo-Dutch
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court), and Sierra Leone (which included courts representing all of the parties).
Over the following decades, Anglo-Portuguese courts were also set up in
Luanda, Boa Vista, Spanish Town, and Cape Town.46 During the course of their
existence, the Sierra Leone courts held that 65,000 captured men and women
should be freed because they had been illegally trafficked in violation of the
abolition of the slave trade; the courts in Havana, Rio, and elsewhere released
another 15,000 Africans. While Nuremberg is the most famous international
judicial institution, even most international criminal law scholars and
professionals do not know about these international tribunals that were
established a century earlier, also in the name of supranational judicial
accountability. Martinez seeks to rescue them from obscurity and offers them up
as inspiration for the future of the international law. Her history of the politicolegal subject ‘humanity’ in international law reaches back to these records to
claim their humanist origins and recuperate the laws and institutions involved in
the abolition of the international slave trade as signifying the salutary juridical
and moral promise of international law.
The story that Martinez tells also begins with a double crisis—the brutalities
of the international slave trade was a crisis in itself, but in addition, the
contradictions between slavery and the age of rights also raised questions of
legitimacy for the revolutions, constitutions and normative claims of the
imperial and slave holding powers heralding the rights of man in this same
period. In 1807, when American and British legislators ruled the slave trade
illegal, slavery itself was legal and thriving in Caribbean sugar plantations,
Columbian gold mines, and American cotton fields. The triangular trade played
a critical role in the political economy of the industrial revolutions that twinned
the liberal revolutions of the late seventeenth century.47 This was the heyday of
colonial expansion in Africa. The political economy of slavery and colonialism
were intertwined in complex ways across the Atlantic and was equally central to
the social, political, and economic underpinnings of these twin revolutions.
If the logic of the “Age of Rights” was predicated on, and promised, the
self-possession of the white man, the fact that these coexisted with slavery and
the slave trade seemed to indicate that that logic also implicitly, yet
unequivocally, affirmed and enacted the dispossession of the black man.
Accordingly, the movement for the abolition of the international slave trade is
often situated in accounts of a developing international legal order that sought
to resolve that contradiction and recognize an evolving rights consciousness on
both sides of the Atlantic as its anchor going forward. Dominant histories of
human rights and humanitarianism seek to redeem the age of rights by framing
46 See Leslie Bethel, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade
Question 1807-1869, in CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES (David Joslin & John Street, eds.,
vol. 6, 1970).
47 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Oxford Univ. Press 2014); ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY (Univ. of North
Carolina Press 1944); LISA LOWE, THE INTIMACY OF FOUR CONTINENTS (Duke Univ. Press 2015);
CEDRICK ROBINSON, ‘THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND ATLANTIC LABOR’ IN BLACK MARXISM
(Univ. of North Carolina Press 1983); WALTER JOHNSONS, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND
EMPIRE IN THE COTTON KINGDOM (Belknap Press 2017). Men and women forcibly transported from
Africa worked the cotton fields in the Americas to supply raw material for the looms of Manchester.
One can tell a parallel story regarding slavery, sugar plantations, and the sugar trade that was vital to
the wealth of Europe.
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the French and American revolutions as a founding moment in shaping a notion
of humanity that organically evolved into the movement for the abolition of the
international slave trade as a crime against humanity. In this vein, Lynn Hunt’s
story of the invention of human rights focuses on the French revolution and the
“rights cascade” it engendered. Similarly, Adam Horscheild situated the
movement to abolish the slave trade and the passage of the 1807 abolition
legislation as the first human rights movement, extending the logic of the
Atlantic revolutions. 48 Jenny Martinez describes the slave trade as the “original
‘crimes against humanity’” (CAH) and the ‘Mixed Tribunals’ established to
monitor abolition of the trade as offering a “bridge” to the international criminal
court (ICC) today.49 In her telling, this ‘bridge to the future’ is constructed by
judicious institutional purpose in the name of humanity.50 In a context where the
ICC has been accused of anti-Africa bias and a neo-colonial prosecutorial
record, the bridge to the mixed commissions is seen to carry with it redemptive
inspiration for tribunals mandated with embroidering human rights and
humanitarianism on international law’s future.
A. RESITUATING MID-19TH CENTURY INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE
MYTHOLOGY OF A POST-RACIAL ICL
The links between Mixed Commissions and contemporary ICL may be
tenuous in terms of influence and impact, but they are instructive in
understanding the backstory (in this case the abolition of the slave trade in the
name of a race-transcending humanity’) that contemporary ICL historians see as
most relevant to ICL legitimacy. Historians of ICL, such as Martinez, see the
slave trade as racial exploitation and have done important work on how the
category of race travelled in different European slave trade systems.51 However,
the potential they attribute to the human rights revolutions and the mixed
commissions they have supposedly birthed is precisely their transcendence of
race in the name of humanity. My interest in this history of the mixed tribunals
is in probing the work of invoking race transcendence and the mixed
commissions as the origin story of international criminal law, and in particular
the laws and norms of CAH. The bridge of CAH may well be a bridge between
mixed tribunals and the ICC, but the story it tells may not be a testament to the
law of humanity but an indictment of it.
The repression of race in the historical narrative of then and now is a
precondition for telling the story of empire and slavery in the mid-Atlantic as a
story of emancipation. Race is foundational to the plot of Atlantic slavery, so to
repress that memory and render race invisible in the work of the mixed
48 In 1807, the British Parliament and American Congress banned the international slave trade. During
subsequent decades, British bilateral treaties with other European powers translated this ban into
transnational tribunals (the ‘Mixed Commissions’) to help police the Atlantic for compliance,
exercising what some describe as an embryonic form of universal civil jurisdiction.
49 JENNY MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 6 (2012). Tribunals discussed supra are called mixed commissions because they were established
through bilateral or multilateral treaties, with countries having combined jurisdiction over the cases
they had to adjudicate.
50 Id.
51 See Jenny S. Martinez & Lisa Surwillo, “Like the Pirate and the Slave Trader Before Him”: Precedent
and Analogy in Contemporary Law and Literature, 35 L. & HIST. REV. 82, 83-84 (2017) (discussing
the category of race in the slave trader and the migrant trafficker).
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tribunals requires an elaborate defensive structure, and it is the juridical category
of humanity that helps forge those defences in the histories told by the discipline
and the memories it represses. Both ever-present, and ever-elusive, race and
racism have a schizophrenic life in international criminal law histories of these
tribunals as part of the first initiative to combat “crimes against humanity” in
those terms. The terms of crimes against humanity are understood as referring
to a colorblind category of humanity that had no explicit racial reference but
were saturated with latent racial significance.52 The notion of humanity posited
as the ‘origin’ of human rights and signifying the promise and potential of
international law is thus shaped by a redemptive universality and a pivotal
erasure of racialized power. As critical race theorists Richard Delagado and Jean
Stefancic have noted in their discussion of American jurisprudence, the very
language of law carries with it a canonical interpretation predicated on silencing
questions of race and power: “the law does have a canon. It consists of terms
like ‘just,’ ‘fair,’ ‘equal,’ ‘equal opportunity,’ ‘unfair to innocent whites,’ ‘nice,’
‘deserving,’ and ‘meritorious,’ all with canonical meanings that reflect our sense
of how things ought to be, namely much as they are.”53 Racialized structures and
imaginaries hide in plain sight in histories of these tribunals as an embryonic
ICL—present everywhere yet not acknowledged anywhere.
The weight of race as part of the legal architecture, as well as the everyday
experience of the law was nowhere more evident than at the doors of the Mixed
Commissions. Here, white judges (presorted according to their nationality)
determined the fate of black men and women hovering in an interregnum
between a regime of property law and a regime of colonial law, objects of
property or subjects of colonial rule. Fanon’s words from a century later could
well have been reporting the work of those Commissions: “When I look for man
in European lifestyle and technology I see a constant denial of man, an avalanche
of murders.”54 The racialized peopling of these commissions have a particular
grammar, juridical and ethical, that shapes central features of contemporary
international criminal law and its claims to act in the name of humanity. Fanon
is here deftly connecting what he would call the “fact of Blackness” with the
structures of racial genocide, at once both epistemic and economic, a matter of
imagination and a matter of physical violence.
Attention to the political economy of the slave trade helps to connect the
dots even more tangibly. Historians of the slave economy have argued that over
the course of the early 18th century, the abolition of the international slave trade
became intertwined with the sustaining of slavery as such.55 Thus, a central
dimension of the backstory to the abolition of the slave trade is that there was a
divergence in the profit circuits of the slave trade, and the profit circuits of slave
holding. For some sectors of the plantation economy in North America, and
arguably for their industrial partners in Manchester and elsewhere, addressing
their labor needs through the market in slaves who had been already brought to
52 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1991).
53 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of a Just
Balance Changes So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851, 862 (1994).
54 FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 236 (1963).
55 WILLIAMS, supra note 46.
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North America was more profitable than depending on the international trade.
Thus, many of the advocates of the abolition of the international trade argued
for it on the theory that it would help ensure that slaves in the national market
will be more valuable. There would be added incentive for slave owners to
ensure the health and wellbeing of slaves they argued, and this in turn would
make slavery a more sustainable social structure. The support for domestic
slavery was not uniform but it is significant that when the question of fighting
for a more universal emancipation came up in the Society for Effecting the
Abolition of the Slave Trade (the organization that led the social movement for
the abolition of the trade) only one of the twelve founding members, Granville
Sharpe, supported full emancipation.56 Many of the other prominent supporters
of the abolition were not opposed to slavery as an institution. William
Wilberforce’s parliamentary speeches made the case for how slave plantations
in the West Indies will profit from the abolition of the international trade.57 In
sum, the humanitarian imperatives underlying the creation of the Mixed
Commissions were conjoined with a complex of other dynamics defining what
qualified as a crime, including chattel slavery.
In her pathbreaking 1993 essay, Whiteness as Property, legal scholar Cheryl
Harris described how the project of racialization was not only about identity and
affiliation but also, fundamentally, a project of stealth material distribution.
“Whiteness as property,” Harris argues, “has carried and produced a heavy
legacy. It is a ghost that has haunted the political and legal domains . . . Only
rarely declaring its presence.”58 Legal struggles against structural racism entail
remembering, naming, and rendering visible the work of racial architectures,
unpacking the mechanics of invisibility, and exposing how racialized systems
drive the plot. In this case, it is about foregrounding how racial capitalism,
including the specific contours of slavery and empire, was central to the
structures and ideologies of the seventeenth and eighteenth world order. This
includes the work of the Mixed Commissions where the privilege of whiteness,
both extraordinary and banal, manifest in travel through nationality and property
ownership without having to declare its presence. Evincing a different kind of
invisibility, blackness hovered between object and subject, property and persons,
past and future, an erased body on the free seas in the age of liberty.
The erasure of ‘race’ from ICL history is partly effected by translating
questions regarding the racial ordering of the Atlantic world into legal questions
about the reach of abolition in the British Parliament and American Congress
and the purview of maritime law, the resolution of disputes through application
of tribunal procedure and the determining of relevant colonial authority, the
defining of social change through inter-European treaties and the constituting of
legal institutions. Law (from the various pieces of national legislation abolishing
the slave trade in Britain, the U.S., France, and elsewhere), and legal institutions
(the Mixed Commissions as well as the national courts that encountered slave
trade cases), provided different kinds of cloaks of invisibility that translated the
politics of race into technical legal questions regarding nationality and
jurisdiction, property and prize law, legal personhood and juridical freedom.
56 ADAM HOCHSCHILD, BURY THE CHAINS: THE BRITISH STRUGGLE TO ABOLISH SLAVERY 110 (2006).
57 Id. at 161.
58 Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1791 (1993).
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Emanating from imperial claims over land and sea, Europeans (often the
English Navy) asserted jurisdiction over Africans on ships brought before the
commission to sort them as objects of property law or subjects of colonial law.
If a ship was flying under the flag of one of the treaty parties and detained under
suspicion of being embroiled in the slave trade, it was brought to a Mixed
Commission where that country was represented.59 Thus, Europe proceeded to
carve up the Atlantic even before Europe carved up Africa at the infamous Berlin
conference.60 The carving up of inter-imperial oceanic jurisdiction through
Mixed Commissions anchor the role of Europe and America in a racialized
structure of world order.61 ICL historians describe how each exercise in
adjudication regarding jurisdiction assessed the applicability of the law
abolishing the trade by focusing on the registration of the ship, nationality of
ship owners, and the circumstances of capture. The privileges, vulnerabilities,
and hierarchies that accompanied racial difference were central to matters such
as nationality and ship ownership so race gets constituted in the details of that
adjudicatory process without race having to be named. The law defining the
crime was ostensibly race neutral, and mobilized language regarding abstract
legal persons, their ownership claims over ships and people, and the nationality
under which the ship was registered.
Thus, an equally significant part of the legacy for contemporary
international law is how the causes of abolition and imperial consolidation
converged. Thus, scholars learned in the legal history of empire have traced how
the imperatives for extending and tightening the reach of the British imperial
constitution led to a renewed interest in establishing legal authority over the high
seas.62 This led to a ramping up of efforts for policing piracy and the slave trade,
and the establishing of an enforcement mechanism throughout the high seas.
Intertwined with this were the long reach of the Napoleonic wars, the war of
1812 and a series of other inter-imperial tensions that made the nationality of the
court adjudicating cases a particularly fraught issue. Setting up tribunals through
bilateral treaties was one way of negotiating these tensions and constituted an
approach of particular value to the British whose imperial star was ascendant but
not uncontested.
If the laws of jurisdiction and nationality are one dimension of the legal
regime of mixed commissions, another dimension, equally saturated with
competing imperial interests, was prize law. The naval patrols that brought in
slave ships became eligible for what was termed salvage, bounty or prize money.
Maritime law incentivized ships to intervene when ships were in peril (because
of storms and other natural causes), but also when they were suspected of illegal
activities, including violation of the laws of war and neutrality, piracy, and the

59 Through the lens of ICL, arguably the Mixed Commissions were early precursors to what we now
term hybrid courts. However, with the history of the Mixed Commissions faded from the collective
memory of ICL, they were not in fact the precedent or inspiration for the hybrid courts that were set
up in Sierra Leone, Timor, or Cambodia. The more proximate point of reference for these were of
course the lessons learned from the ad hoc tribunals.
60 LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES,
1400-1900 43 (2010).
61 In addition to maritime laws regulating colonization, war, piracy, trade, and the registration of a ship’s
nationality, treaties regarding abolition also anchored jurisdictional boundaries within the Atlantic
Ocean.
62 BENTON, supra note 59.
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slave trade. Prize law functioned in tandem with treaties regarding the abolition
of the slave trade to further regulate what counted as legitimate and illegitimate
capture, and if African men and women on board were freed or shipped back
across the Atlantic with their captors.64 There were immediate material rewards
for the ship captains who pursued slave ships if they were able to prove that the
cargo was illicit. There was no question of any recompense for the slaves
themselves even when it was a slave rebellion that catalyzed the bringing of a
ship to harbor.65 What is at stake in slave-trade contingent prize law is not just
real property, but property in racial privilege—a racially contingent property
right to implement the abolition.66
The precarity of personhood recognized in every mixed commission is
underscored when situating the law abolishing the slave trade in the market
logics of the trade. The prohibition drove up the price of slaves so there was
augmented profit incentive to trade slaves; thus, legal abolition played a complex
role in the calculation of risk and 25 per cent of slaves in the transatlantic slave
trade were transported in the half century that following the prohibition. In this
way, the political economy of the traffic in persons cast its shadow in both the
revenue and loss columns of the structural beneficiaries of the slave trade,
linking private law and the law of nations, law regulating private property, and
law regulating international trade. The recognition of the captured African as a
legal person conjoined a certain sort of juridical freedom for the captured, a
certain sort of financial bounty for the patrolling officers, and a certain sort of
normative legitimacy for the laws and institutions of slave trade abolition. This
conjoining of the interests of the dispossessed and the self-possessed, the victims
and the beneficiaries, is an ‘achievement’ of the deracinated definition of law
and humanity and an achievement for this ICL enhancing story of origins. Race
is rendered invisible even in legal principles (such as abolition) that purport to
hold racism to account.
The judicial construction of freedom is a powerful register of the complex
race translation work of the law of nations. Captured Africans seesawed between
legal property and juridical freedom, and concomitantly, seesawed in between
being valued as cargo and valued as persons—it all depended on whether the
captured man or woman would be successfully trafficked to great profit, or
forcibly freed if the ship was hauled into a Mixed Commission. The majority of
ships that came before the Commissions had captured Africans on board and the
court had to determine the terms of liability and free the would-be slaves. The
men and women who had been captured aboard these ships hailed from across
the African continent. It is significant, however, that the courts ordered their
release but imposed no further responsibilities on the slavers to ensure they were
able to go home. Thus, in the majority of cases, the ‘freed’ found themselves

63 The Act abolishing the slave trade specified bounties of “the Sum of Forty Pounds lawful Money of
Great Britain for every Man, or Thirty Pounds of like Money for every Women, or Ten Pounds of like
Money for every Child or Person not above Fourteen Years old.” 47° Georgii III, Session 1, cap.
XXXVI: An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade (1805), http://www.pdavis.nl/Legis_06.htm.
64 Lauren Benton, Abolition and Imperial Law, 39 J. IMPERIAL & COMMONWEALTH HIST. 355 (2011).
Benton has shown this was an era of inter-imperial struggle for dominance over the oceans and the
legal landscape of abolition operated as one terrain on which that struggle was conducted.
65 Padraic Xavier Scanlon, The Rewards of Their Exertions: Prize Money and British Abolitionism in
Sierra Leone, 1808-1823, 225 PAST & PRESENT 113 (2014).
66 See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
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hundreds or thousands of miles from home, in an environment where they did
not speak the local language and did not have the resources or geographic
knowledge to return to their families. By mid-century, Freetown had over 40,000
people from across the continent who spoke over a hundred languages.67 Thus
we see very concretely the production of ‘freed slaves’ as legal persons without
race, history, and social context; their humanity reduced to their legal status and
detached from their community. Not a counter to the dehumanization of slave
relations, juridical freedom carried its own oppressive pathologies and justifies
its own unfreedoms, but this time internal to the notion of the human.68
ICL historians and ICC advocates situate law as the great emancipator and,
concomitantly, lament lack of access to law as the source of abjection. Yet the
work of law may be more complex—foregrounding race here, backgrounding it
there, predicating jurisdiction and standing on racial classification in one arena,
and travelling as race-neutral in another. Once a captured ship travels through
the adjudicatory process, race gets constituted as background fact rather than the
product of legal processes; repressed and buried to present itself only as that
which is overcome through judicial recognition of an African’s humanity. The
rule of law is invested with the authority that attaches to a standard-bearer of this
idealized notion of a pure redemptive humanity. Moreover, legal recognition of
a captured man or woman as ‘human’ yields the affirmation of white normativity
in the very heart of what it means to be human. Arguably, this legal recognition
dependent precarity is part of the memory of racial difference that shapes
personhood in front of ICL today where having your case heard in court is often
framed as validating your victimhood, and by extension your personhood. The
maldistribution of the profits of ICL legitimacy can be tracked along W.E.B. Du
Bois’s reflections, a century after the abolition of the trade in England and
America, on the ‘outlook for the darker races of mankind’ as he predicts the
persistence of ‘the color line’.69 Or to put it in a more contemporary vernacular,
the colorline blind erasure of racial world orderings from this story of ‘crimes
against humanity’ marks the line of white privilege as the historic origins of
ICL.70
For ICL historians like Martinez, the work of the Mixed Commission in
Freetown and elsewhere is an antidote to the morass of disillusionment that

67 MARCUS REDIKER, THE AMISTAD REBELLION 44 (2012).
68 There are analogs here to the post emancipation world in America that prompted Saidiya Hartman to
ask if “the extension of humanity to the enslaved ironically reinscribe their subjugated status?” SAIDYA
HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION 22 (997). See also SAMERA ESMEIR, JURIDICAL HUMANITY (2012)
(on how freedom cannot be conceived outside of what is legally declared free).
69 “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line: the relation of the darker to the
lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.” W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE
PRESENT OUTLOOK FOR THE DARKER RACES OF MANKIND 47-54 (Eric J. Sundquist ed., 1996).
70 For instance, we can see how race travels as both structure and personhood in the description of ICL
history as conjoining humanitarian aims with international adjudication. Racist tropes saturate the
affective constructions of guilt and innocence, of monstrous perpetrators and needy victims. They are
constituted through, and constitutive of, the over determining architecture of the ICL system, while
also being part of how the system is experienced and navigated in its quotidian intimacy for those who
are in the system as judges and lawyers, perpetrators and victims. Yet race remains invisible—there is
no explicit reference to racial categories in the ICC’s official statements; one would be hard pressed to
prove racist intent in describing the work of the office of the prosecutorial office; the most prominent
officials of the ICC have hailed from ‘the darker nations.’ Contemporary criminal law employs abstract
legal categories that decisively eschew race. Indeed, the ICC may be said to explicitly invoke race only
to prosecute it (as in its Darfur cases).
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attends the work of international courts in the Hague today. It advances a
redemptive story about the potential of international law and liberal humanism
by going back to the tribunals to redeem the promise of international courts as a
platform for morality marrying power. In reading race and its erasure into that
story, we get a different narrative about how Euro-America empowered itself for
and through imperial conquest in the wake of the slave trade, and this
empowerment worked partly by constructing a category of ‘whiteness’, and by
mirrored necessity, a racial other. Yet it is not a whiteness that heralds its own
presence. Rather it is a whiteness that presents as nothing less than the new world
order; here latent in the cosmopolitan institutionalism that seeks to knit together
humanitarian aims with international adjudication. The Mixed Commission
treaties linking and separating England from America, America from France,
France from Spain, Spain from Portugal, Portugal from the Netherlands, and so
on, were building blocks in the discursive production of whiteness, an imperial
whiteness. When Du Bois invokes the ‘color line’, he is not speaking of melanin
and naturalized racial categories, but the line that traverses land and ocean to
trace the routes of colonialism and the slave trade to occupy the systemic
inequalities and hierarchies of world order. Indeed, on this view, the color line
stretches both before and beyond the twentieth century that Du Bois references,
as the common thread of liberal universalism, from the rights revolution of the
seventeenth century to the operation of international institutions in the twentyfirst century. Race and racial difference are of course fundamentally historical
constructions that mean different things in different social, political, and
historical contexts; thus, the work of racial difference in the Atlantic then, and
in the Hague today, is profoundly different even when connected. However,
foregrounding racial capitalism (in both its material and ideational dimensions)
opens a window into the work of the colorblind law of the “human” in holding
the color line and putting wind in the sails of a racially mal-distributive regime
of global governance.
We have discussed how ICL histories celebrating the abolition of the slave
trade can operate as decoy distracting us from the ways in which slavery was
legal and even sustained by the abolition. Humanitarian discourse can also do
work that warrants unpacking when inflecting abolition discourse, often
empowering not the agency of the enslaved but the agency of the rescuer. The
moral economies of rescue were pivotal in the legitimacy of the Mixed
Commissions and the financial and institutional support that they could
command from their sponsoring states, particularly Great Britain. Thus, many
abolitionists were keen to distinguish their human rights campaign from slave
led freedom struggles that challenged the rule of law, such as Nat Turner’s
rebellion or the underground railroad that pre-empted rescue with rebellion, and
challenged the rule of law as part of the problem not the solution. For instance,
the Haitian revolution was something of an embarrassment for the abolition
movement because it conveyed militancy for the overthrow of slavery that was
not dependent on developing the moral sympathy of the British and American
public. The abolitionist paper The Anti-Slavery Record seeks to “soften the
memory of the Haitian Revolution” through alternative narratives such as a story
titled the Humanity of the African Americans” “depicting a ‘loyal’ slave who
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saved his master’s family from retribution.” The humanity of the slave had to
be proved in this two-step dance rejecting slave agency in the struggle for
freedom, while making themselves sympathetic characters inviting rescue.
Equally, for the moral compass of rescue to point to international law as the true
north, the politics of resistance and abolition had to be depoliticized, moralized
and reframed through dynamics that anticipated the victim-savior-savage triad
that Makau Mutua describes as the coordinates of the contemporary human
rights movement.72 The law of salvage refers, in international maritime law, to
the material rewards that could be claimed by rescuing an imperiled ship, here
prize law attached to the mixed commissions set up a parallel moral salvage that
could be claimed by rescuing an enslaved African.73
The regime of the ‘crimes against humanity’ that is instantiated in the mixed
commissions is a splitting of the human between those who have a surfeit of
rights, and those who need their rights bestowed from afar. Borrowing from
Jacques Ranciere one can say that the rights the abolitionists were keen to grant
the captured Africans were “the rights of those who were unable to enact any
rights or even any claim in their name”.74 When discussing juridification, we
discussed a process for sublimating race-talk into law-talk to produce the
abstract legal human subject of ICL; with moralization, the premise of moral
visibility as human is not the re-channeling of racial categories into juridical
categories, but the overcoming of race and racial identity. One is human despite
being black—recall Toussaint’s interrogation of the human “we are black, it is
true, but..”. With whiteness as the default content of humanity, the moral
framing had to be one that reinforced that racial normativity. This was both a
process of framing the enslaved as making a plea for recognition that they were
just like whites and embedding it in campaigns empowering whites to grant that
recognition. It was the imperial benefit of the rights revolutions: “you do the
same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor.
Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with
medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes, and rights.”75
The Anti-Slavery Committee chose a seal for its campaign that was
designed to underscore that this was a campaign of rescue and beneficence. The
seal had an image of a kneeling slave (designed by the pottery magnate Josiah
Wedgewood) with an emotive caption “Am I Not a Man and a Brother”; this
image and caption became the de facto logo and slogan of the abolitionists.76
The seal invoked the voice of the enslaved man, but it was used by white British
abolitionists on medallions that were pinned onto garments, embossed into
platters the abolitionists displayed in their homes, and so on. Not unlike the
Kony2012 bracelets and the “Save Darfur” pins, the material culture of
eighteenth century humanitarianism underscores that was a project where ICL
“recognition” was in fact rescue. The kneeling slave in the image was designed
71 SUE PEABODY & KEILA GRINBERG, SLAVERY, FREEDOM, AND THE LAW IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 81
(2007).
72 Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J.
201 (2001).
73 Jacques Ranciere, Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?, 103 THE SOUTH ATLANTIC Q. 297 (2004).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 128.
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with physical features intended to leave the abolitionist in no doubt about the
intended racial references. Even more acutely, however, his supplicant posture
and abject plea cemented racial definition: it was part of the racial ordering of
humanitarian sentiment that black people prayed to white people for recognition,
a prayer that overlooked race in extending recognition, human to human. To
sport that, the Wedgewood medallion was to display human solidarity,
inscribing difference as internal to humanitarianism such that one human granted
recognition while the other human pleaded for recognition. The human was
internally split, carrying with it these contradictions and hierarchies, and
generosity and exploitation.
CONCLUSION
In our discussion of redemptive histories of international law, we have
sought to provide alternative readings of both Nuremberg and Freetown by
resituating the political stakes of celebrated incidents of legal virtue. This
reframing has entailed connecting the dots between law and political economy,
between regulation of ships on the Atlantic and the profit circuits of the
plantation economy, and between Nuremberg and the International Monetary
Fund. Most significantly, this reframing of international legal legacies entailed
revisiting the history of international criminal tribunals in an effort to
parochialize the invocation of “the interests of humanity.”77 For instance, the
mandate and role of the Mixed Commissions is the establishment of the rule of
humanity through canonical legal terms in the global racial ordering of the day,
treaty, jurisdiction, prize law, property, and persons. In this framework, the
extension of the human category to the illegally enslaved is a gesture of humane
and humanitarian recognition. Slave traders were violating the law that indicated
the illegality of the trade, but the abolition was itself an embryonic articulation
of the notion that the victims of these crimes were not just the enslaved, but
humanity as such. Indeed, to describe the victims as the enslaved is to understate
the crime; it is the formulation of the slave trade as a “crime against humanity”
that elevates it to one that violates the very value of humanness.
The multi-pronged de-racialization of “crimes against humanity” in ICL’s
backstory haunts the notion of the human and the entanglements of the human’s
dual record of extraordinary humane solidarities and extraordinary inhumane
actions. The work of the category “crimes against humanity” is to steer our gaze
away from those entanglements to instead focus on juridically recognized
perpetrators and the drama of the slave traders as moral and legal outliers. The
slave trader emerges as that exceptional perpetrator whose most remarkable and
enabling characteristic is not his location in the racialized logics of profit and
property that sustain the majority of humanity’s profiteers, but his moral
pathology. This denial of “the entanglements of slavery and freedom”78
empowers liberal juridification as a central mechanism forging the expulsion of
race and racial consciousness from the heritage of the “human.” Indeed, racial

77 DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL (1st
ed. 2000).
78 SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 151 (1997).
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consciousness is equated with the illiberal and inhumane profiting from racial
distinction; then the slave trader, in contemporary ICL, is the perpetrator of
genocide and a war criminal. Constituting and legitimizing the juridical
authority and moral compass of international law has entailed the racial
cleansing of that heritage of the human as race neutral rule of law; a project that,
therefore, remains forever entangled with law defining and prosecuting the
inhuman. As Walter Johnson has argued, there is “ideological work
accomplished by holding on to a normative notion of ‘humanity’—one that can
be held separate from the ‘inhuman’ actions of so many humans.”79 In
understanding the imbrication of the field of ICL history in that ideological
work, we need to confront the challenge that the most shocking fact about the
international slave trade was not a rare inhuman monstrosity, but a banal human
ordinariness.80 Sanitizing the notion of the human may be a project of masking
its internal inhumanities and its record of complicities, individual and collective,
ideational and structural. Johnson further notes that in refusing to confront the
dark side of human virtue, “We are separating a normative and aspirational
notion of humanity from the sorts of exploitation and violence that history
suggests may well be definitive of human beings: we are separating ourselves
from our own histories of perpetration.” The “human” sheds the weight of racial
baggage—what Alexander Wheliya describes as “excess”—to emerge as a
svelte, universally inclusive figure that does not implicate the structures and
beneficiaries of racial capitalism.81 Indeed, it renders the “rescuer” too a victim,
part of the anonymous mass of humanity wronged by the crime against humanity
that is the slave trade. Thus, the narrowing of the designated perpetrator works
alongside the broadening of the designated victim to an all-encompassing
humanity, not just black humanity. A “crime against humanity” renders the
victim abstract, deracialized, universal; today we might say it is a category that
stands for the rallying cry that “All Lives Matter.”82
To sum up, when confronted with a crisis of legitimacy, scholars of
international law and international relations have been tempted to return to a
redemptive history of international law and institutions as a guide and
inspirations to safer waters. Instead, we may want to consider the legitimacy
crisis as a prod to interrogate international legal history for its canonical biases,
particularly with attention to the legacies of slavery, colonialism, and
neocolonialism that are intertwined with international legal history. Thus,
history remains pivotal today with authoritarianism getting new lease of life in
a range of countries around the globe. However, with the emergence of
authoritarian and fascist forces in earlier moments, we may need in fact to make
different connections between then and now, and between what happens in the
global South and what happens in the global North. Emerging from battles over
fascism and decolonizing, Aimé Césaire, the Martinique poet of negritude,

79 Walter Johnson, To Remake the World: Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice, BOSTON REV. (Feb.
20, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/forum/walter-johnson-to-remake-the-world.
80 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (Penguin Books
2006) (1963).
81 ALEXANDER G. WEHELIYE, HABEAS VISCUS: RACIALIZING ASSEMBLAGES, BIOPOLITICS, AND BLACK
FEMINIST THEORIES OF THE HUMAN 55 (2014).
82 For critical analysis of the ‘All Lives Matter’ turn, see Laura Flanders, Building Movements Without
Shedding Differences: Alicia Garza of #BlackLivesMatter, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://www.truthout.org/video/building-movements-without-shedding-differences-alicia-garza/.
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described the boomerang effect between one and another, and his advice about
how to connect those dots remains ever relevant. Thus, I want to conclude by
considering one of the most poetic passages of Césaire’s Discourse on
Colonialism, both mournful and sharply denunciatory, but full of wisdom for
making connections across time and place that disrupt rather than redeem
international law. “We must study,” Césaire says, “We must study how
colonization works to decivilize the colonizer, to brutalize him in the true sense
of the word, to degrade him, to awaken him to buried instincts, to covetousness,
violence, race hatred, and moral relativism.” “We must show,” Césaire says that
we must show that each time a head is cut off or an eye put out in Vietnam
and in France[,] they accept the fact[;] each time a little girl is raped and in
France they accept the fact, each time a Madagascan is tortured and in France
they accept the fact, civilization acquires another dead weight, a universal
regression takes place, a gangrene sets in, a cancer of infection begins to spread,
and that at the end of all these treaties that have been violated, all these lies that
have been propagated, all these punitive expeditions that have been tolerated, all
these patriots who have been tortured, at the end of all the racial pride that has
been encouraged, all the boastfulness that has been displayed, a poison has been
distilled into the veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds
towards savagery . . . And then one fine day the bourgeoisie is awakened by a
terrific boomerang effect: the gestapos are busy, the prisons fill up, the torturers
standing around the racks invent, refine, discuss . . . 83
The crisis of authoritarianism that we are confronting in many parts of the
world today in the 21st century was foretold by “the mad and melancholy record”
of crises of centuries past in Vietnam and Madagascar, Hiroshima and the Black
Atlantic. In writing redemptive histories of international law as a salutary
response to crisis, we ignore international law’s own imbrication with these
crises and fail to attend to how the gangrene sets in.

83 CÉSAIRE, supra note 7.

